DOG BLITZES (TCU vs WISCONSIN)

One of the most pivotal plays of the Rose Bowl was Tank Carder's tipped pass on the Wisconsin failed 2 point play. The crazy thing about football is that Wisconsin had the right play at the right time, but still came up short. At the same time TCU was not in too bad a defense for the situation, and despite two major mistakes, they managed to keep Wisconsin out of the end zone. In this post I will examine TCU's DOG Package and analyze the Dog call on Wisconsin's two point conversion attempt.

DOG BASICS

The Dog package at TCU is a simple concept. 4 Guys are bringing pressure on one side of the offense. The usual way to run it is to bring a safety and linebacker from the same side. This creates enormous pressure and will likely leave at least one person free. In the TCU system a "Dog" call is a combination of a "Bullet" (backer blitz) with a "Smoke" (Safety Blitz). Man coverage is run behind it. The man rules are easy: The FS covers the #2 WR to the side of the dog, the corners cover the most outside guys. The other linebacker accounts for a back, and the WS accounts for a 4th WR or another back. Lets look at some examples.

If you don't understand the jargon of the call here is a quick explanation. The first "T" Refers to the way the 3 Technique will be set. "T" Means he will align towards the TE (Y). The second "T" Refers to the side which the blitz will be run from, this is also the TE side. Dogs is the type of blitz that is being run, and the "A" at the end is the gap the linebacker is assigned to run through.

The Left Corner has the Z, the FS has the Y, the WS and Mike will work off on the backs and the right corner will cover #5. This is a pretty straight forward process. This is an easy example. The Use of strength calls and blitz directions is crucial for the effective execution of the DOG package. Lets look at another example versus a 2x2 formation. Here you will see how the double strength calls are needed to get the defense coordinated properly.


Everything should be straightforward except for the "S" in the call. The "S" tells the secondary that the blitz will be coming from the "Split" side which is the side away from the TE(Y). That is why the numbers are reversed in this example.

FIRE TECHNIQUE

The last important part of the Dog call is that D-End to the side of dog is on an Auto-Fire call. The TCU system can tag a Fire call onto a play even if it is not Dog blitz. However, the fire call is a must when a dog call is on. A Fire call is simply an alert to the D-End that he needs to take an inside rush on the offensive tackle if the tackle pass blocks. If it is a running play he just attacks the C-gap. This allows the offensive tackle to get into a lose-lose situation that results in somebody coming free on the DOG. Here is an example.


DOG CALL VS WISCONSIN

Lets look at the Dog call that was used versus Wisconsin on the 2-point conversion attempt. The call is F-Tag W-DogsB. (I am not sure if this is the exact wording that TCU used but it will suffice for the example.) From the offensive perspective, Wisconsin aligned in a TE trips formation.




Versus this formation the blitz and assignments woulds look like this.

The "Tag" call is to the D-Tackle, alerting him to slant into the A-Gap. Usually on Dog calls versus trips, TCU will elect to make a "switch" call and simplify the coverage via alignment. A switch call looks like this. The "F" call sets the 3-tech to the field, and the "W" means "wide" as in run the Dog from the wide side of the field. (The secondary works off the wide/short concept, as the front uses Field/Boundary.)

Versus a pass the "switch" call is much better because of the alignment of the safeties. However, it is not as good versus the run. Any cutback or run away from the Dog would score easily. Given that Wisconsin was pounding TCU all night, this would not be the best way to run a Dog. TCU probably elected not to go with the switch call, because they wanted to remain stronger versus the run. (by keeping a linebacker in to play the weak-side run). (This is just speculation.)

You can see this alignment and assignment is more sound versus the run then the "Switch" call would have been. What you will see in this play, is that TCU makes two big mistakes on the execution of the blitz. One in the coverage, the other on the actual pass rush.

Coverage Error

The Weak Safety for TCU #9 Alex Ibiloye fails to cover the #3 wide receiver on the settle-out route.

This left a receiver wide open . Starting with alignment, the Weak Safety was in bad shape, even if he did try to cover the #3 WR he was out of position to cover the particular route the receiver ran. TCU has shown on blitzes that their players will stem to effective alignments regardless if it is safety or linebacker in coverage.

If you look at the highlights, you can see Gary Patterson pointing and yelling after the play was over. Like any good coach he was more concerned with correcting errors than celebrating one of the biggest defensive plays of his career.

Blitz Error

The blitz error was more subtle and shows that the person who made the second best effort on this play (behind Tank Carder) was the right tackle #58 Ricky Wagner. Lets look at the Wisconsin protection scheme.

Wisconsin used a 4 man slide to the right to pick up the TCU blitz. This should not be problem for the DOG blitz, because 5 men will be coming with only 4 to protect. (4 From the dog side plus the nose).

Just looking at the side of the Dog, someone should be free. Even if the Wisconsin center and guard pick up the D-Tackle and Sam Backer (which they did) the tackle should be in a lose-lose with the D-end and SS. The breakdown happens here. Wagner made a great play by pushing the D-End down to the ground preventing the end from cutting inside of him, and then came off to block the SS #28 Colin Jones. It was impressive.

I have not seen nor think I will ever see an O-Line coach expect one his linemen to block 2 guys like this. It goes to show how good the Wisconsin offensive line is. Here is the highlight of the play.




Even though Wisconsin had the right play called and did a great job protecting it, it still comes down to play-makers. Tank Carder got blocked and saw the QB get ready to throw, then did what play-makers do, make plays! He bats the pass down and essentially seals the win for TCU.

From ESPN Dallas Carder is quoted saying:

"I was definitely on the blitz," Carder said. "We thought they were going to run. Coach [Gary] Patterson put me on the blitz. I got blocked so I stepped back and he [Tolzien] cocked his arm back and I jumped up and swatted it down."

CONCLUSION

This post was in no intended to downplay TCU and the game they played. They showed that they are the #1 Defense in the Nation. Its a tribute to them that even on a play with a couple of busted assignments, they can still find a way to make plays.

The Dog Blitz is very effective and great versus the run and pass. TCU blitzed a lot in this game, and they needed too. Wisconsin was pounding the ball better than anyone I have ever seen against TCU. The frogs played the run aggressive all night, and not just by blitzing. The safeties were in hard flat-foot reads that ended up with tackles close to the LOS. The top two tacklers from the game were safeties. #28 Colin Jones and #3 Tejay Johnson each had 10 tackles. It was a big win for TCU and for the 4-2-5 defense in perhaps the biggest stage the defense had ever been on.

Spread Run Variations (Mississippi State/Oregon)

If you have been keeping up with College Football at all over the last few years, you probably noticed that offenses keep getting more creative in their effort to keep defenses off balance. Dan Mullen and Chip Kelly are two coaches who have been some of the most active innovators of the spread running game. In this post I will explore a couple of run variations that these two coaches have used this year.

MISSISSIPPI STATE'S DRAW/COUNTER VARIATION

After looking at this post from thespreadoffense.com, I observed Dan Mullen using some creativity in the way he ran the counter. He used many variations of the play but one in particular stood out to me.

Working from a base 11 personnel formation:

The base way to block the counter to the TE side would be to:

1. Release the TE on the SS
2. Have the PST and PSG Team to the BSLB
3. Pull the BSG to kick the DE out and the BST to seal up on the PSLB
4. The QB would hold the BSDE with the mesh
   
5. WR's Block most dangerous threats

This is nothing revolutionary. The counter has been a staple in football for years. Dan Mullen ran his variation using three simple changes.

1. The person responsible for sealing on the PSLB
2. Backfield action
3. Ball Carrier
   

In his variation the BST stayed to block to the BSDE. When the QB caught the snap he set up and showed pass, and the running back worked behind the pulling guard to seal up on the PSLB.

This draw/counter play puts pressure on the defense. First, if the backers (and safeties) are getting their run/pass reads from the backfield (this is common even in college) , they will be less aggressive on the run. Second, there is a high chance the backers will be caught off guard by who is going to be blocking them. Third, even if backers were alert to the one pulling linemen, it is not a reliable key. Mississippi State had been pulling one guard on Play Action passes throughout the game.

Another thing that worked in this play's favor was the situation. It was 3rd and 2, its a short enough down that the offense had just about their whole playbook to work with. Given the play call range, the Kentucky Defense had to much guesswork. In situations like these, the smartest thing for the defense to do is avoid bringing pressure and play a base call geared towards the run and short passes. For example a cover 1 variation. This was good for the Mississippi Offense because linebackers running through the gaps disrupts these plays.

This video is from www.thespreadoffense.com. The play occurs at about 5:10. The play is run a few other time throughout the game.




OREGON'S STRETCH/MIDLINE VARIATION

Chris Brown at Smartfootball wrote this article about Oregon's Zone Read of the defensive tackle. Oregon ran a variation of this earlier this year and combined it with stretch (outside zone principals. Working from 20 personnel, they aligned in this formation.

In this play the center, Right Guard, and Right Tackle full zone (outside zone). The runningback meshes with the QB on an outside sweep path. Again, this is nothing revolutionary. The creativity came on the backside. The Left Guard and Tackle released inside and blocked the BSLB and Safety. Finally the H works back across the formation and kicks out the BSDE. The unblocked person was the defensive tackle in a 3-technique. This was the QB's read.


Defenses have responded to defending midline plays by squeezing the d-tackle down the line to account for the running back and letting a linebacker work around for the quarterback.


The problem with that plan against this play is that it will not work effectively.

First, there is no way the d-tackle can play the running back (unless the back gets the ball and tries to cutback, not likely). Second, the backer will be getting a fast flow read, and be working to defend the running back themselves. So the play is essentially a ploy to get the D-tackle to do what he has been taught, and then run the QB ball right behind him where a huge hole will be.


The squeezing of the d-tackle opens up the play. Here is another view of the play to demonstrate the positioning of the players when the QB pulls the ball.

This play put pressure on the D, because it uses the techniques they have been taught against them. The reads that each of the defenders get will put them out of position versus the place the offense will actually attack.

CONCLUSION

These plays are examples that offensive coaches are constantly trying to stay a step ahead of the defense. Dan Mullen and Chip Kelly have the reputations they have, because of innovation like this. It will be a ongoing challenge for defensive coaches to constantly adapt and adjust to the offense as fast as the they (offense) has adjusted to the defense. I wonder when we will see these variations down at the high school level. They may already be, who knows. These have been the first times I have seen these particular play variations.

Defending Pull Schemes

There are many teams that rely upon pull schemes to move the ball. These schemes create problems for defenses that try to play base gap control defense and read and react. Plays like the dart are troublesome for these schemes. Lets take a look at the couple of typical pull schemes that teams employ.

This is the Dart and it has become a spread staple.

This is a simple fold play.

If you look closely a problem is created. The gap the pulling linemen is going throw gets split into two. This is similar to the problem that the ISO creates. This extra gap gives flexibility to the running back. Usually teams try to leverage their backers to deal with this. However this is not a viable option because the backers create a huge cutback lane, if they do this. Consider these two plays with the backers leveraging the puller.

Lets look at the the problem that is created. First off, consider the # of gaps that are needed to defend the running game.


There are six gaps and in this example we have 6 defenders to cover each of these gaps. So, whats the problem? The problem is that the offense moves where the gaps are on pull type plays.

What makes it a problem for the defense is that the defense does not rearrange the way that the 6 gaps are defended. So essentially, a gap is left open for the ball carrier to run through. If there is 6 gaps and 6 defenders then how is there an open gap?

The pulling scheme puts two players in one gap. The defense needs to avoid this. 2 defenders in one gap is a big problem. A simple and solid counter for these plays is needed. A good way to stop these plays is the fire the backers through their gaps. This allows them to penetrate the backfield before the pullers or double team get to them. However, firing your linebackers constantly is usually not the best idea (unless the team can't stop it).

Another way to defend this is have one of the linemen defeat the linemen at the point of attack. However, this is not the most reliable method year in and year out.

This was a long explanation of some simple plays, but I wanted to establish the problem the offense creates for the defense. The most effective way for countering an offensive concept is to look at the weakness of a particular scheme.

I was beating my head against the wall when I first started dealing with these plays, I tried to rearrange my fronts, stunt backers, and twist linemen. There would be some success, but I would leave myself open to other plays. It was a guessing game, but sooner or later I would get the defense out of position and give up a big play. I needed an effective counter that would remain sound against other plays.

What I realized was that both these plays relied on the guard base blocking the 3-technique one on one. I started slanting the 3-technique from B to A-Gap. This was a problem for guards to pick up because they did not expect a three technique to do this. If I had a tackle that had a problem with this technique, then I would cheat him back a step. This is not a hard technique to execute on defense, an it became my best defense for these types of plays. In one game the 3-tech had 6 tackles for a loss on this stunt.

The best part of it was, I was sound against everything else. The only change in the defensive scheme was that the backers had the B gaps.


If run effectively, the offense will have to get away from the single pull plays rely on counter OT or zone runs to get the ball going. I would rather face those plays. It allows the DE to spill the ball to the Outside guys.

This might seem like an overly simple adjustment. But I have found it to be one of the most effective ways to defend pull schemes. Teams have tried to counter it, but it more or less takes them out of pull schemes. Whenever you run a front with a 3 and a 1, the three technique draws a one on one block. This block is the weakness that the defense can take advantage of.

Even if you pull towards the 3 there is a one on one created. Consider this example.

Still the 3-tech penetrating the A gap creates a problem for this play.

This might have been too long an explanation for such a simple adjustment, but I found it helpful to understand it this way.

Split Safety-Zone Blitzes

Much has written about fire-zones. The zone-blitz is a great change up for the defense and creates a lot of offensive confusion. In fire zones you bring 5 and drop into 3 under 3 deep coverage essentially. Most teams have incorporated some form of fire-zone into their packages, and with the nature of football teams are beginning to adjust to it. As football evolves other things are needed to keep the offense off balance. Another reason for utilizing other kinds of zone pressure is that cover 3 can be kind of constricting to people who run a lot of split safety coverage.

The thing about it is, teams that don't run a lot of 3 deep (or don't care to) are used to being in split safety coverage. Split safety coverage is a completely different animal than cover 3. For 1, cover 3 is a full field concept, split safety coverages operate on a 1/2 field concept. This gives need to the ability to bring zone pressure with split safety coverage, and be able to control the coverages on each half of the field.

The ideas behind split safety zone blitzes are simple and close to the ideas behind fire-zones.

• Confuse the protection scheme and create pressure
  
• Play aggressive squat/halves zone coverage
• protect the defense against the screen and draw
• Simple and adaptable to different formations.

THE CONCEPT

1. Zone-blitz with split-safety coverage concepts
2. Bring 4-man pressure and play halves coverage to both sides
3. Bring 5 or use a double spy, and play 1/2's to one side and man to the other. (mixture of zone blitz and man blitzes)
4. Put a spy (or two) on the back to protect against screen, draw, scramble, and dump off

Just like fire zones, there are many different ways you can put blitzes together and be sound. I am not going to go into a bunch of different blitzes, but I will use 1 blitz to illustrate the concepts. As a coach it comes down to applying concepts. I am sure given a particular front and scheme that many effective zone-pressures can be put together.

EXAMPLE-Zone 1 side, Man 1 side

The first step in executing an effective zone pressure is pre-snap disguise. You have to be able to present a normal alignment to the offense and then stem into your pressure, this puts pressure on the O-Line and QB. It is difficult to recognize and communicate blocking assignments in a short amount of time. Consider the alignment below:




This is a basic 4-2 split safety coverage look. Now with proper stemming the defense can move into position to execute a zone blitz. Versus the gun it best to do it when the QB calls for the snap.




This leads to the final alignment just before the snap




The FS side will be in 1/2's coverage. The corner will be making a hard read of #2 covering him on any outside break, but running with #1 if #2 is vertical. The FS is in deep 1/2's technique, while the Read Side backer is walling #2 from the inside and up. the away side of the coverage is man with the weak safety on #2 and the corner on #1. The blitz will involve a double spy:



The SS and Mike backer are off the edge, the ends engage the tackles then drop to spy screen, draw, scramble, and the tackle and nose are executing a twist stunt with the tackle going first.

EXAMPLE- Zone on Both Sides


Simple adjustment with a 4-pressure and a single spy.



Now both sides are playing 1/2's coverage, there is still a 4 man pressure, and a player responsible for screen, draw, scramble.

The coverage is flexible and simple, even versus a trips look the adjustments are easy.


Both backers are walling #2 and #3 with the FS over the top. The corner and weak safety on the back side are free to play multiple coverages like they would with special coverage to the read side.

You can even change up the blitz versus a trips look. Bringing another safety and using a double spy is simple.


The options are near limitless. This zone-pressure concept is a natural fit for coaches who like flexible split-safety coverage. Also, it is easy for the safeties to get each side into coverages. It follows common sense principals that fit naturally into any 2-high defense.

TRICK PLAYS

I am a big fan of using trick plays. They keep the defense off balance and can really punish a team for being too aggressive or even too passive. The play below is a good trick play to use before halftime or the end of a game when the defense is in prevent.