Game Theory and Building Ranges

One of the things coaches worry way too much about is tendencies. Every year somebody walks into the office with a self-scout report and starts acting like the season is over because we ran a play too many times from a formation. I think a lot of coaches are solving the wrong problem. A tendency by itself is not a problem. An exploitable tendency is a problem. Those are two completely different things. If I line up in the I formation and run bootleg for two straight weeks, that doesn't automatically mean I've made a mistake. It just means I've established something that people are going to see on film.

The mistake is thinking you have to break the tendency immediately. In fact, I think a lot of coaches get ahead of themselves here. They become so worried about being unpredictable that they never establish anything in the first place. They're trying to balance a range before they've created one. Sometimes I want you to see the tendency. Sometimes I want the defensive coordinator to spend an entire week talking about bootleg. The reason is simple: once I know what you're preparing for, I can start building answers around it.

Let's use the I formation as an example. If I run bootleg from it one week and then add wedge the next week, I've started building a range. If I add quarterback sneak the week after that, I've expanded the range even further. By the time I get to the fourth or fifth opponent, the formation no longer means bootleg. It means bootleg, wedge, sneak, and whatever else I've attached to it. The defensive coordinator can still have a tendency report, but now he has a much harder time exploiting what he's seeing because the formation has become balanced over time.

One of the best examples I have comes from the Flexbone. We spent a season playing games with Belly G and quads formations. One week we'd line up in quads and run Belly G right at the overload. The next week we'd break the huddle looking like we were headed to quads, shift into a wing flank set, and run Belly the opposite direction. Later we'd line up in the wing flank and trade into quads. Then after defensive staffs had spent all week coaching the trade, we'd line up in quads, fake the trade, and run the play right where we started. None of these adjustments were difficult for us. We weren't learning a new offense. We weren't reinventing the wheel. We were making small adjustments that forced the defense to spend an enormous amount of time preparing for possibilities.

That's really the heart of game theory in football. The best ideas are usually cheap for you and expensive for the other guy. We were spending very little practice time on those adjustments while forcing the defense to spend meeting time, film study, and practice periods preparing for them. Every adjustment they made created another thing they had to coach. Every possibility they had to prepare for consumed resources. The offense was operating efficiently while the defense was becoming overloaded.

The same thing happens on defense. Let's say you're playing a three technique in an even front. Most of the game he may line up and play his base technique. Eventually the guard gets comfortable. He thinks he knows where the defender is going to end up. Now you slant him inside. Later you two-gap slant him. Suddenly the guard isn't sure what he's seeing and the center starts paying attention as well. The important thing is that you don't have to do it every play. In fact, doing it every play would defeat the purpose. You only need to do it enough that the offense has to account for the possibility.

Pressure packages work the same way. If I establish a strong safety blitz early in the season, every offensive coordinator after that has to account for it. Maybe I only bring it ten percent of the time. It doesn't matter. The quarterback has been coached on it. The protection has been coached on it. The offensive line has spent practice time discussing it. The possibility itself has value. Even when I don't call the blitz, the offense still has to respect it.

That's why I think football is a game of ranges. I'm not trying to fool you on one play. I'm not trying to be random. Random football is usually bad football. What I'm trying to do is create enough balance that you cannot confidently attack me. If you know exactly what's coming, you've got the advantage. If you have to defend multiple possibilities, now the advantage starts shifting. The goal is not eliminating tendencies. The goal is building ranges that make those tendencies difficult to exploit.

Football Book Idea Gauging Some Intrest

 I am thinking of writing a book with various topics. Don't know the level of interest but I already wrote a table of contents. Wanted some feedback. 

Football Concepts: Theory and Practice

Preface: This is not a scheme or package to sell to you. It is a thought process driven book we will cover situational football, various offenses and special teams concepts. It is a thinking book for the aspiring coordinator, head coach, or football fan in general. Some things will be NFL driven, College, and High School. 

This is book in not intended to be read from page 1-end. Look at the table o f contents and jump around however you like. 

Topics.

1. Situational Football (On Schedule. Behind, Short yardage) 

2. Menus and Checklists

3. Defensive Coordinator Job Description

4. Offensive Coordinator Job Description

5. Play #1 Outside Zone in Concept.

6. Coverage #1 Robber Coverage in Concept 

7. Kickoff considerations (Blocking Schemes, Butt Side Avoidance, Expense)

8. Economic Consideration #1 in football (talent as the scarce Resource) (Coaching and Athleticism)

9. Economic Concept #2 Time as a constraint in practice preparation

10. How much offense is too much

11. Game Theory and the Optimal and unexploitable Approach to balancing Play calling ranges (Use Poker Pros vs New Age Players) 

12. Offensive Goals to consider when building an offense

13. "Myth of the Spread Offense" - Put the QB is shotgun and everyone is in the spread

14. Flexbone inside Veer 101: 

15. Flexbone Mid Triple 101

16. Flexbone Down (Belly G 101)

17. 4-2-5 Safety Play template 

18. The Y Cross

19. The Sail

20. The Double Post

21. Tampa 2 and Trap Corners 

22. Cover 3 Flat Drop Technique 

23. Middle Field Safety Coverage Free Safety: Do Not over Complicate it. 

24. The Lonesome polecat

25. Through the eyes of one player part 1: Game Theory Defense: The Offensive Guard vs the Defense Inside Zone Variables

26. Eliminating Variable to simply your offense 

27. Signal Systems 

28. Stealing Signals

29. What is a tendency in football

30. How awesome is the Lombardi Sweep video

31. Gary Patterson 4-2-5 Sideline Operation 

32. Data Driven Football vs Emotional Football 

33. Pin and Pull Always Grades out

34. Ok Lets talk about the RPO: Its what everyone is talking about

35. Flexbone Rocket toss 101: The cheapest play in football 

36. 2 Point Plays

37. Things poor coaches say

38. Why offensive line and db coaches are so important

39. If you want to hide a coach put him at running backs

40. The Poop Sandwich - You Better know where it is and who is eating it!

41. Offensive line pass pro and Qb shot clock 

The C-Gap: Where Football is Won and Lost

Football is a game of leverage, numbers, and real estate, and no spot on the field dictates success more than the C-gap. This is where the game is fought. Every great offense finds a way to own it, and every great defense is built to shut it down. If you can control the C-gap, you control the game. It’s that simple.

Why the C-Gap is the Key to Everything

The C-gap is the space between the offensive tackle and tight end—or where a tight end would be in formations without one. This is the stress point of every defensive structure. Defenses are always forced to make tough choices here. Overcommit, and you expose yourself elsewhere. Play it soft, and an offense will hammer you all game long. It’s the one area of the field where every major offensive concept either attacks directly or manipulates defenders into giving it up.

Think about it: outside zone, power, counter, inside zone, veer, midline, RPOs—they all revolve around the C-gap. Everything else? That’s just window dressing designed to force defenses into bad answers.

Outside Zone: The Stress Test

Outside zone forces a defense to declare. It stretches defenders horizontally, making them choose between holding their ground or running with the play. The offensive line is working to reach defenders, creating lanes where the running back can either hit the perimeter or cut back into the C-gap.

Defenses have two choices: flow over the top and risk getting gashed on a cutback, or squeeze inside and give up the edge. Either way, they’re wrong. That’s why outside zone is so effective—it makes defenders pick their poison.

Power and Counter: The Hammer

Gap schemes like power and counter are direct punches at the C-gap. Power sends a pulling guard to clear the way, and counter follows the same blueprint but with an added misdirection element. These plays force defenses to respect an immediate attack, which then sets up the rest of the offense.

If the defense plays soft, power will gash them for 5-6 yards per pop. If they commit extra bodies, now the offense can hit them with play-action or quick hitters to the weak side. Power isn’t just a play—it’s a statement.

Power Read: The Evolution

Power read takes traditional power and adds an option element. Instead of blocking the end man on the line of scrimmage (EMLOS), the quarterback reads him. If he crashes down, the QB keeps the ball and attacks the C-gap. If he stays wide, the ball gets handed off inside where the offensive line has the advantage.

This play puts defenses in a bind. If they overcommit to stopping power, the QB keeps it and exposes them. If they hesitate, the play runs like classic power, with a numbers advantage at the point of attack.

Inside Zone: The Cutback Game

Inside zone might look like it’s hitting the interior gaps, but its real danger is the cutback through the C-gap. Defensive linemen who fly upfield create natural running lanes, and linebackers who overpursue open it up even more.

The key to inside zone is patience. The running back presses the frontside before making a read—if defenders overflow, he plants and cuts right back into the C-gap. This is why inside zone is so deadly against aggressive defenses. They think they’re playing fast, but really, they’re just playing into the offense’s hands.

Veer and Midline: The Old-School Solution

Option football has always been about forcing defenses into impossible decisions. The veer isolates the EMLOS, forcing him to take either the QB or the back. If he commits to one, the offense takes the other, making him wrong every time.

Midline works similarly but attacks the defensive tackle instead. If he stays wide, the handoff goes inside. If he crashes, the QB keeps it and hits the C-gap himself. These plays aren’t new, but they’ve been wrecking defenses for decades because they work.

Spread to Space: Making the Defense Play Honest

Spread teams attack the C-gap differently, but the concept is the same. They use formations to move defenders out of the box, then run the same plays into the newly created space.

When a spread team lines up in 3x1 formations, the third man from the center—whether a slot receiver or tight end—forces the defense to adjust. If they stay tight, the offense has numbers to the perimeter. If they widen, the C-gap is soft, and the run game eats. RPOs work off this same principle, holding linebackers in place just long enough for the offense to strike.

How Defenses Fight Back

Defenses aren’t just letting this happen. They have their own ways to battle for the C-gap:

• Boxing the EMLOS – Keeping the end man square to force runs back inside.

• Spilling Runs – Attacking the outside shoulder of blockers to push everything wider.

• Two-Gapping – Using strong interior linemen to control both sides of an offensive player.

• Scraping Linebackers – Trading responsibilities post-snap to mess with read keys.

Because defenses adapt, offenses have to stay a step ahead. That’s where play-action, misdirection, and motion come in. It’s all about keeping the defense from keying in on one thing.

Final Thoughts

If you want to win football games, win the C-gap. It’s the focal point of every offensive attack, and it’s where defenses make their stand. Whether you’re running outside zone, power, veer, or spreading teams out, everything comes back to this one spot on the field.

The best offenses find ways to attack it. The best defenses find ways to defend it. The teams that understand this battle are the ones that control the game. If you don’t, you’re playing on your heels, reacting instead of dictating. The fight for the C-gap is the fight for football itself.

Ready for a Return

I have been wanting to make a comeback for a while (6 Years). When I last posted I was coaching Safeties and now I have been a DC, and most recently a head coach. I don’t know if anyone follows this blog anymore, but curious to see.

Like anything, as you learn more you feel like you know nothing. I have a bit of writers block, if anyone has a topic they would like me to tackle, let me know. Let’s start at home base with something 4-2-5. Reply here or on twitter @Mike_Evans12

Exploiting Situations: West Virginia vs Clemson

Dana Holgorsen has earned a reputation for himself by fielding offenses that light up the scoreboard and put up monster stats. He doesn't do this by playing small ball; picking up a few yards here and there. He does it by creating explosive plays. Big plays happen when the offense exploits a weakness in the defense or a defender or two blow their assignment. In the first quarter of the Orange Bowl, the West Virginia offense completed a 34 yard pass to a wide open receiver. This play is an example of how the offense can create explosive plays by exploiting a weakness in the defense.

The play that will be analyzed can be seen here:

This play was created by exploiting 4 primary factors:

1. Situation (Down and Distance)

2. Ball Position

3. Formation

4. Personnel

The first factor is probably the biggest one on a football game meta-level. The final 3 can be chunked together into one thing.

EXPLOITING THE SITUATION

In a previous post I covered down and distance strategy. The goal for the defense is to get the offense into a manageable 3rd down situation (3rd and 7 +). The way to do that is to limit gains on first down to 3 yards or less. This is why the running game is so important to the offense because it can keep the offense out of difficult third down situations.

This play occurred on first down. It is in Clemson's best interest to keep the West Virginia offense from gaining more than 3 yards. In order to do that they can't be overly worry about the big play. This does not mean you allow the big play, but that you get defensive calls in that are more aggressive towards the run. Because of this principal, Clemson would most likely be run conscious in this particular situation. "Run Conscious" meaning probably in a base front with zone coverage.

BALL POSITION, FORMATION, PERSONNEL

These next three factors work together.

Ball Position

The ball is on the hash, it is on or around the hash approximately 80% of the time. Modern defenses are even more concerned with ball position because opposing offense have become more creative in utilizing it. The hash is such a concern that many defenses will call coverage strength to the field the majority of the time. One of the few things that will keep a defense from calling its passing strength to the field is trips formations.

Formation

This brings us to our next factor. Holgorsen uses a trips formation on this play. Defending trips involves a varied plan of attack in and of itself. When you combine the formation with the ball position a very particular set of circumstances need to be considered. First, the trips are into the boundary. This is not a common occurrence for the defense. Most defensive trips schemes are built on the premise that the offense is running trips towards the field. Boundary trips is in the back of the defensive coordinators mind, but does not call for concern like field trips does.

How does boundary trips effect the defensive thought process? First there is one WR with a ton of field to work with. This makes you think twice about putting a corner one on one with him. Second there is more space to work with for outside running plays, option or stretch being the most probable in this situation. Third, the constricted area that the 3 WR's have makes many trips side passing plays not likely. Finally, the offense can still out-flank the defense albeit with less space. This is still a cause for concern, because if not properly aligned, the defense can be hit for a 5-10 yard running or passing play easily despite the lack of space.

Because of this the defense still needs to align properly to avoid getting out-flanked while being concerned (even more so) with weak-side (field side) runs or passes.

The defense has the classic trips problem, but magnified to the open side. Which side has priority? The trips or open side? One of the things some defenses factor in is the alignment of the back. However, in this particular formation this is no help, because he is aligned directly behind the QB.

Personnel

Finally the personnel is a cause for concern. In this particular play one player is the main concern. The single side WR Stedman Bailey #3 does not have the most catches on the team, however, he leads the team in yards per reception, yards receiving, and touchdown catches. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that he is doing it on big plays. Bailey's alignment is a concern as well. He is in a position to run a quick out, comeback, fade, or anything else. His alignment opens up a large range of potential routes.

Putting it Together

Factoring all things together it is probably in the defense's best interest to free the field side safety up and have him help on the run and with coverage on Bailey. Calls like Solo or Mable would not be ideal for this situation.

THE PLAY

Clemson's Defense

They opted for a basic 4-2 front alignment and the backers are not overly cheated one way or the other. This is considered typical for this formation. The secondary is showing a two shell, which could mean anything. This could be a disguise for any number of things. The alignment that stands out is the boundary side corner. He is aligned outside the #1 WR 7 yards deep. He is not likely to come down into a 1/2's concept. Plus if the corner was playing a 1/2 concept he would need the field side safety to cover #3 vertical or a backer( vs this play that would not have been a good idea either). He appears to be getting ready to bail out.

They end up playing some type of 1/4's concept to the trips side with a 1/2's concept to the open side (could be a bracket).

WEST VIRGINIA'S PLAY

It appears that the QB might have been (don't know for sure) looking towards Bailey 1st on some type of Air-Raid "Choice" concept.

Upon seeing the double coverage, the QB would work his progression back to the trips side. This is where Dana Holgerson's play call most clearly exploits the situation. If he gets Bailey one on one, then great, throw him the ball (he actually still gets behind the double team). If they double cover him, then he has a play that will exploit the likely coverages that a defense would run on first down.

If you look at the routes, this play type can be effective versus most first down defensive calls. It really hurts Clemson's quarters concept.

The H vertical route draws the Strong Safety's attention. He cannot play the post route by the Z because the H would be wide open. The corner cannot get into coverage of the H or Z because of his outside alignment. The only thing the defense could have called to be solid versus these routes is a 1/4's bails (pure zone). That is not a sound call on first down.

This play makes the corner irrelevant and forces the SS to make a decision. He chooses to cover to the H (wise choice) and allows the z to come open on the post.

The defensive coordinator had to recognize the possibility of these play types, so he must of had a plan for them. Many defense's use backers to play wall technique on the first route to work towards the middle of the field, this forces QB's to throw high balls that give DB's time to break on it.

So where were the backers?

Its was a first down situation, and the offense showed run first. The play action kept the backers from assisting in coverage. You can't blame the backers either. Its first down, Division I linebackers are taught to play run first especially in a 1st and 10 situation.

The play action draws the backers up and because of the coverage called the Z is able to get wide open. What other zone coverages could cover these routes effectively and keep the defense from covering Bailey 1 on 1? Besides pure zone quarters, none really without linebacker help

I am not gonna draw them all up, but think about it.

1/2's: Who is gonna cover the post? There is 3 vertical routes to stress the safeties.

Cover 3: The H is gonna open on the seam with no-one to jam him, unless you play a mable tech and drop the SS down. I already discussed that this is a bad idea considering the other things the offense could do in this situation.

Special: Same problems that Clemson had, the SS is in a tough situation.

CONCLUSION

This play shows how the defense can be manipulated on 1st down. Given the situation, formation, ball position, and personnel the defense will be influenced to do certain things. If the offense understands what the defense will do, then they will be able to create big play opportunity. This shows why Holgorsen has been successful

DEFENDING TRIPS- DISGUISE AND SCHEME

In this post I will focus on defending the trips side of a 3x1 formation. There are certain considerations that need to be made when planning out a strategy for dealing with trips. Here is the good news, usually, defending 3x1 is much easier than defending 2x2 formations. The defenses that have trouble with 3x1 formations are usually defenses that prefer to play the game with balanced fronts/coverages (hence the discomfort with the overload that trips create) or don't understand that defending trips like anything else is a risk reward game. The defense cannot stop everything, every play. The goal is to have the defense in the best position to defend the most likely range of plays the offense can run in a particular situation. Lets look at some different options you can run towards trips.

1. A Cover 3 concept.

2. An X-out concept like Special

3. A Pattern-match coverage with a safety poaching #3 (solo)

4. The Classic: Straight up Man or Man-Free

Using these 4 options we can up with a plan for handling trips in a general strategy. I am not gonna get to much into the technique or scheme of each of these, the links provided offer that. The first thing to consider is disguise.

DISGUISE

Disguising coverage in football is done in 2 primary ways.

1. Stemming and Moving around constantly every play to the extent that the offense does not know what you are in pre-snap

2. Show the same look every-time and then stem to your coverage right before the snap.

Either approach can work, but I will discuss the 2nd because it will easier to explain, and in my opinion is easier to execute.

I like running 2-Solo, so I prefer to base my trips look out of that.

From this look you can stem and work into the other looks without much difficulty.

Lets look at the others.

Looking at these alignments it should be evident that there is not too much movement involved in the stemming of each.

Again these are simple examples, but even in their simplicity they can be difficult for the typical High School QB to read. The other disguise principal involves the movement of the SS. Since it is harder for the SS to align himself out of position, he can be the defenses most liberal person stemming. He can move around, show blitz, man, ect.

WHEN TO CALL WHAT

This comes down to game-planning. The generic rule is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each coverage. Here is a simple list. It is not complete nor detailed, but sufficient to illustrate the point.

Ideally, the defense wants to be in a coverage that best defends what the offense is trying to do. If the defense expects run toward the trips, then 3-Mable or 2-Solo are best. If the defense is worried about middle and quick game, then cover 1 is the best bet. Finally, if the single WR is a concern, then special bracket is optimal.

No matter what trips coverages the defense has in its package, they need to be coordinated and planned. The best way to protect each one is to mix them up and have a sound disguise for them. This post was a simplistic look at disguising and calling different coverages to trips. If anyone has any questions about anything let me know in the comment section.

I'll be back!

Sorry guys for not keeping up with my posts, I have been in transition. I am getting everything together, and should start getting some posts back up in the next week or two.

Some of the topics will be

*defending trips coverages, strategy, and technique (disguise) By Request

*Drills and Technique for coaching Safeties

*Man Coverage

If any of you have any suggestions please leave a comment, it is a lot easier to write posts when someone gives me some ideas of what people are interested in.

-Mike