One of the most pivotal plays of the Rose Bowl was Tank Carder's tipped pass on the Wisconsin failed 2 point play. The crazy thing about football is that Wisconsin had the right play at the right time, but still came up short. At the same time TCU was not in too bad a defense for the situation, and despite two major mistakes, they managed to keep Wisconsin out of the end zone. In this post I will examine TCU's DOG Package and analyze the Dog call on Wisconsin's two point conversion attempt.
DOG BASICS
The Dog package at TCU is a simple concept. 4 Guys are bringing pressure on one side of the offense. The usual way to run it is to bring a safety and linebacker from the same side. This creates enormous pressure and will likely leave at least one person free. In the TCU system a "Dog" call is a combination of a "Bullet" (backer blitz) with a "Smoke" (Safety Blitz). Man coverage is run behind it. The man rules are easy: The FS covers the #2 WR to the side of the dog, the corners cover the most outside guys. The other linebacker accounts for a back, and the WS accounts for a 4th WR or another back. Lets look at some examples.
If you don't understand the jargon of the call here is a quick explanation. The first "T" Refers to the way the 3 Technique will be set. "T" Means he will align towards the TE (Y). The second "T" Refers to the side which the blitz will be run from, this is also the TE side. Dogs is the type of blitz that is being run, and the "A" at the end is the gap the linebacker is assigned to run through.The Left Corner has the Z, the FS has the Y, the WS and Mike will work off on the backs and the right corner will cover #5. This is a pretty straight forward process. This is an easy example. The Use of strength calls and blitz directions is crucial for the effective execution of the DOG package. Lets look at another example versus a 2x2 formation. Here you will see how the double strength calls are needed to get the defense coordinated properly.
Everything should be straightforward except for the "S" in the call. The "S" tells the secondary that the blitz will be coming from the "Split" side which is the side away from the TE(Y). That is why the numbers are reversed in this example.
FIRE TECHNIQUE
The last important part of the Dog call is that D-End to the side of dog is on an Auto-Fire call. The TCU system can tag a Fire call onto a play even if it is not Dog blitz. However, the fire call is a must when a dog call is on. A Fire call is simply an alert to the D-End that he needs to take an inside rush on the offensive tackle if the tackle pass blocks. If it is a running play he just attacks the C-gap. This allows the offensive tackle to get into a lose-lose situation that results in somebody coming free on the DOG. Here is an example.
DOG CALL VS WISCONSINLets look at the Dog call that was used versus Wisconsin on the 2-point conversion attempt. The call is F-Tag W-DogsB. (I am not sure if this is the exact wording that TCU used but it will suffice for the example.) From the offensive perspective, Wisconsin aligned in a TE trips formation.
Versus this formation the blitz and assignments woulds look like this.
The "Tag" call is to the D-Tackle, alerting him to slant into the A-Gap. Usually on Dog calls versus trips, TCU will elect to make a "switch" call and simplify the coverage via alignment. A switch call looks like this. The "F" call sets the 3-tech to the field, and the "W" means "wide" as in run the Dog from the wide side of the field. (The secondary works off the wide/short concept, as the front uses Field/Boundary.)
Versus a pass the "switch" call is much better because of the alignment of the safeties. However, it is not as good versus the run. Any cutback or run away from the Dog would score easily. Given that Wisconsin was pounding TCU all night, this would not be the best way to run a Dog. TCU probably elected not to go with the switch call, because they wanted to remain stronger versus the run. (by keeping a linebacker in to play the weak-side run). (This is just speculation.)
You can see this alignment and assignment is more sound versus the run then the "Switch" call would have been. What you will see in this play, is that TCU makes two big mistakes on the execution of the blitz. One in the coverage, the other on the actual pass rush.Coverage Error
The Weak Safety for TCU #9 Alex Ibiloye fails to cover the #3 wide receiver on the settle-out route.
This left a receiver wide open . Starting with alignment, the Weak Safety was in bad shape, even if he did try to cover the #3 WR he was out of position to cover the particular route the receiver ran. TCU has shown on blitzes that their players will stem to effective alignments regardless if it is safety or linebacker in coverage.If you look at the highlights, you can see Gary Patterson pointing and yelling after the play was over. Like any good coach he was more concerned with correcting errors than celebrating one of the biggest defensive plays of his career.
Blitz Error
The blitz error was more subtle and shows that the person who made the second best effort on this play (behind Tank Carder) was the right tackle #58 Ricky Wagner. Lets look at the Wisconsin protection scheme.
Wisconsin used a 4 man slide to the right to pick up the TCU blitz. This should not be problem for the DOG blitz, because 5 men will be coming with only 4 to protect. (4 From the dog side plus the nose).
Just looking at the side of the Dog, someone should be free. Even if the Wisconsin center and guard pick up the D-Tackle and Sam Backer (which they did) the tackle should be in a lose-lose with the D-end and SS. The breakdown happens here. Wagner made a great play by pushing the D-End down to the ground preventing the end from cutting inside of him, and then came off to block the SS #28 Colin Jones. It was impressive.
I have not seen nor think I will ever see an O-Line coach expect one his linemen to block 2 guys like this. It goes to show how good the Wisconsin offensive line is. Here is the highlight of the play.Even though Wisconsin had the right play called and did a great job protecting it, it still comes down to play-makers. Tank Carder got blocked and saw the QB get ready to throw, then did what play-makers do, make plays! He bats the pass down and essentially seals the win for TCU.
From ESPN Dallas Carder is quoted saying:
"I was definitely on the blitz," Carder said. "We thought they were going to run. Coach [Gary] Patterson put me on the blitz. I got blocked so I stepped back and he [Tolzien] cocked his arm back and I jumped up and swatted it down."
CONCLUSION
This post was in no intended to downplay TCU and the game they played. They showed that they are the #1 Defense in the Nation. Its a tribute to them that even on a play with a couple of busted assignments, they can still find a way to make plays.
The Dog Blitz is very effective and great versus the run and pass. TCU blitzed a lot in this game, and they needed too. Wisconsin was pounding the ball better than anyone I have ever seen against TCU. The frogs played the run aggressive all night, and not just by blitzing. The safeties were in hard flat-foot reads that ended up with tackles close to the LOS. The top two tacklers from the game were safeties. #28 Colin Jones and #3 Tejay Johnson each had 10 tackles. It was a big win for TCU and for the 4-2-5 defense in perhaps the biggest stage the defense had ever been on.
Outstanding article, very interesting and broke down extremely well. You are hitting the nail on the head with the scheme analysis not sure about the terminolgy that TCU uses but after reading your breakdown maybe they should use yours.
ReplyDeleteVery Nice..I like the switch call concept...Couple of notes..
ReplyDeleteIMO (of course)The #4 rusher must be aware of a flare release if a RB is aligned to his side..we call this crash blitz technique. A crash blitzer is always the outside blitzer on any dog. A dog being defined as a 4 man blitz to one side of the center. The crash technique blitzer is responsible for any flare release and pitch on the option..basically responsible for the egde(contain) of the defense..also versus trips we will sometimes check to a form of cv 3 to help with the route you draw..it's also easier for the kids IMO
Good point, I probably should have put something on that. We call it a spy rule and that the safety running the dog cannot let a running back cross his face.
ReplyDeleteFrom a 2005 clinic, Patterson was at TCU and talked about the defense. I'm sure it has changed, but the base ideas are the same from the info I have. In TCU's base D, the D End appears to be head up on the TE, just as Patterson drew it up in 2005. What I want to know is what the advantage of that? Is that D end trying to play the C and D gap based on the block he faces?
ReplyDeleteIn the replay it looks like the RT very athletically slid to the outside blitz and the DE firing just let his momentum get him off balance and fall to the ground. Plus the rb was sliding over to take him if he had stayed on his feet. I think the DE was probably leg weary at that point .
ReplyDeleteBut the key as you said was the weak safety. It looked like he might have been brain weary. He just completely blew his assgnment. Im not sure it was necessarily the best call on offense or defense but they were both good calls. Had the WS executed then the TE would have been covered but how well? If Tolzien released quickly (which he can) to the outside shoulder might have been a TD even with good coverage.
Bottom line - just great coaching and schemes on both sides. Maybe TCU a little more brilliant gave them the edge. But when both teams are well schemed its hard to find much fault.
Drew,
ReplyDeleteYou right about the loss of balance from the D-end, that is what allow the tackle to block him with a little push and come off on the Safety.
Kevin,
The DE is head up on the TE (6 tech) for good reasons. He is a C-Gap player first. Being in a 6 keeps the TE from blocking down on you, and still allows you to squeeze a down block by the tackle. If you put the DE inside the TE, you are risking of having the TE block down and Tackle fold around. Also with the 6 tech, the offense is never sure if he is a D or C player. So with an effective slanting you can really confuse the offense.
I think that we might be looking into it too much...Wisconsin had run the ball down the throats of the TCU defense the entire 2nd half. I think GP was guessing they'd run the ball (or at worst do a Play-Action Pass), so he brought a Run Blitz (that probably would've hit a PAP in the mouth). Looking at the replay, the WS was not looking at #3, instead he had his eyes in the backfield. I think it was more a great call by the Wisconsin OC (calling a pass when the DC was thinking run), but like aelephans mentions...TCU still made a play.
ReplyDeleteon a side note...i hate the switch call since the offense can dictate what the defense does vs. a 3x1 set. I think instead of running the switch call like it's drawn here, all you have to do is assign the Dog side LB (Carder) to #3, and bring the backside LB (Brock) through the B gap. with that pressure vs. that slide protection, Brock might have come through free since the guard would not have seen an immediate threat (since his DT slanted to the A-Gap) and he would've taken the DE, the RT taken the SS, and it would've been the RB vs. the LB one-on-one...and i'll take that matchup all day. Plus...you don't overshift so you still look gap-sound on the backside
It happens a lot. They came short with all those opportunities. price per head services was split in this game.
ReplyDeleteOne of the most pivotal plays of the Rose Bowl was Tank Carder's tipped pass on the Wisconsin failed 2 point play. The crazy thing about ... dogbowlsset.blogspot.com
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