Exploiting Situations: West Virginia vs Clemson

Dana Holgorsen has earned a reputation for himself by fielding offenses that light up the scoreboard and put up monster stats. He doesn't do this by playing small ball; picking up a few yards here and there. He does it by creating explosive plays. Big plays happen when the offense exploits a weakness in the defense or a defender or two blow their assignment. In the first quarter of the Orange Bowl, the West Virginia offense completed a 34 yard pass to a wide open receiver. This play is an example of how the offense can create explosive plays by exploiting a weakness in the defense.

The play that will be analyzed can be seen here:

This play was created by exploiting 4 primary factors:

1. Situation (Down and Distance)

2. Ball Position

3. Formation

4. Personnel

The first factor is probably the biggest one on a football game meta-level. The final 3 can be chunked together into one thing.

EXPLOITING THE SITUATION

In a previous post I covered down and distance strategy. The goal for the defense is to get the offense into a manageable 3rd down situation (3rd and 7 +). The way to do that is to limit gains on first down to 3 yards or less. This is why the running game is so important to the offense because it can keep the offense out of difficult third down situations.

This play occurred on first down. It is in Clemson's best interest to keep the West Virginia offense from gaining more than 3 yards. In order to do that they can't be overly worry about the big play. This does not mean you allow the big play, but that you get defensive calls in that are more aggressive towards the run. Because of this principal, Clemson would most likely be run conscious in this particular situation. "Run Conscious" meaning probably in a base front with zone coverage.

BALL POSITION, FORMATION, PERSONNEL

These next three factors work together.

Ball Position

The ball is on the hash, it is on or around the hash approximately 80% of the time. Modern defenses are even more concerned with ball position because opposing offense have become more creative in utilizing it. The hash is such a concern that many defenses will call coverage strength to the field the majority of the time. One of the few things that will keep a defense from calling its passing strength to the field is trips formations.

Formation

This brings us to our next factor. Holgorsen uses a trips formation on this play. Defending trips involves a varied plan of attack in and of itself. When you combine the formation with the ball position a very particular set of circumstances need to be considered. First, the trips are into the boundary. This is not a common occurrence for the defense. Most defensive trips schemes are built on the premise that the offense is running trips towards the field. Boundary trips is in the back of the defensive coordinators mind, but does not call for concern like field trips does.

How does boundary trips effect the defensive thought process? First there is one WR with a ton of field to work with. This makes you think twice about putting a corner one on one with him. Second there is more space to work with for outside running plays, option or stretch being the most probable in this situation. Third, the constricted area that the 3 WR's have makes many trips side passing plays not likely. Finally, the offense can still out-flank the defense albeit with less space. This is still a cause for concern, because if not properly aligned, the defense can be hit for a 5-10 yard running or passing play easily despite the lack of space.

Because of this the defense still needs to align properly to avoid getting out-flanked while being concerned (even more so) with weak-side (field side) runs or passes.

The defense has the classic trips problem, but magnified to the open side. Which side has priority? The trips or open side? One of the things some defenses factor in is the alignment of the back. However, in this particular formation this is no help, because he is aligned directly behind the QB.

Personnel

Finally the personnel is a cause for concern. In this particular play one player is the main concern. The single side WR Stedman Bailey #3 does not have the most catches on the team, however, he leads the team in yards per reception, yards receiving, and touchdown catches. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that he is doing it on big plays. Bailey's alignment is a concern as well. He is in a position to run a quick out, comeback, fade, or anything else. His alignment opens up a large range of potential routes.

Putting it Together

Factoring all things together it is probably in the defense's best interest to free the field side safety up and have him help on the run and with coverage on Bailey. Calls like Solo or Mable would not be ideal for this situation.

THE PLAY

Clemson's Defense

They opted for a basic 4-2 front alignment and the backers are not overly cheated one way or the other. This is considered typical for this formation. The secondary is showing a two shell, which could mean anything. This could be a disguise for any number of things. The alignment that stands out is the boundary side corner. He is aligned outside the #1 WR 7 yards deep. He is not likely to come down into a 1/2's concept. Plus if the corner was playing a 1/2 concept he would need the field side safety to cover #3 vertical or a backer( vs this play that would not have been a good idea either). He appears to be getting ready to bail out.

They end up playing some type of 1/4's concept to the trips side with a 1/2's concept to the open side (could be a bracket).

WEST VIRGINIA'S PLAY

It appears that the QB might have been (don't know for sure) looking towards Bailey 1st on some type of Air-Raid "Choice" concept.

Upon seeing the double coverage, the QB would work his progression back to the trips side. This is where Dana Holgerson's play call most clearly exploits the situation. If he gets Bailey one on one, then great, throw him the ball (he actually still gets behind the double team). If they double cover him, then he has a play that will exploit the likely coverages that a defense would run on first down.

If you look at the routes, this play type can be effective versus most first down defensive calls. It really hurts Clemson's quarters concept.

The H vertical route draws the Strong Safety's attention. He cannot play the post route by the Z because the H would be wide open. The corner cannot get into coverage of the H or Z because of his outside alignment. The only thing the defense could have called to be solid versus these routes is a 1/4's bails (pure zone). That is not a sound call on first down.

This play makes the corner irrelevant and forces the SS to make a decision. He chooses to cover to the H (wise choice) and allows the z to come open on the post.

The defensive coordinator had to recognize the possibility of these play types, so he must of had a plan for them. Many defense's use backers to play wall technique on the first route to work towards the middle of the field, this forces QB's to throw high balls that give DB's time to break on it.

So where were the backers?

Its was a first down situation, and the offense showed run first. The play action kept the backers from assisting in coverage. You can't blame the backers either. Its first down, Division I linebackers are taught to play run first especially in a 1st and 10 situation.

The play action draws the backers up and because of the coverage called the Z is able to get wide open. What other zone coverages could cover these routes effectively and keep the defense from covering Bailey 1 on 1? Besides pure zone quarters, none really without linebacker help

I am not gonna draw them all up, but think about it.

1/2's: Who is gonna cover the post? There is 3 vertical routes to stress the safeties.

Cover 3: The H is gonna open on the seam with no-one to jam him, unless you play a mable tech and drop the SS down. I already discussed that this is a bad idea considering the other things the offense could do in this situation.

Special: Same problems that Clemson had, the SS is in a tough situation.

CONCLUSION

This play shows how the defense can be manipulated on 1st down. Given the situation, formation, ball position, and personnel the defense will be influenced to do certain things. If the offense understands what the defense will do, then they will be able to create big play opportunity. This shows why Holgorsen has been successful

The Numbers Game

I apologize for not posting in quite some time. I have been stretched thin, between the hectic schedule of football season and finding time for myself. I am working on a few projects which I will post in the near future (hopefully). This post will be focused on alignment philosophy, more specifically the numbers game.


WHY A NUMBERS GAME?

With the presence of 22 players on the field at the same time, football is a numbers game. Offenses use the numbers game to take advantage of the defense while the defense attempts the offense from doing so. The rules of football allow the offense to align in multiple formations, far more than a defense can reasonably prepare for. To combat this, defensive coaches over the years have developed alignment rules and principals.

Alignment can be difficult for players, which is why good coaches teach rules to their players. Also, alignment can be difficult for the coach at times. Coaches have developed their own set of principals to help themselves with alignment to various formations. What are these principals? There are varied options amongst different coaches, but more or less they attempt to adhere to the same principals. When a defensive alignment is considered consistent with a coaches' principals it is said to be "sound".

TRAINING WHEELS-- BALANCING THE NUMBERS

Football 1 on 1 instructs defensive coaches to balance numbers with the offense. New coaches are drilled on this concept by veterans. The thought process stems from the idea that the offense will attack you, if they have a numbers advantage at the point of attack. This is a good concept, but it does not need to be taken to far.

I know a coach that I worked with when I first began coaching that followed a strict "balancing" principal. I am sure most have you have heard about balancing the numbers before, for a refresher or for those whom are not sure about what I am talking about:

Balancing the defense with the offense is a simple process of counting. You start with the offense beginning at the center; count everyone aligned to the left of the center as 1. The center, the QB, and anyone even with the ball as 1/2 a person. Second, add that total up and repeat the process for the other side. Next, draw up your defense count the players on each side of the center the same way you did with the offense, remembering to count anyone aligned even with the center as 1/2. So defensively any head up nose, backer or safety aligned over the center counts as 1/2. Finally, check your numbers to each side and see if they match. If the defenses' numbers are not consistent with the offenses' numbers then the defense is said to be misaligned.

I am not advocating this is the system to determine your alignments by any means. As I have grown as a coach I have "taken off" the training wheels. This system can help a new coach line up in a manner to avoid getting absolutely killed. However, it by no means guarantees the most effective and ideal alignment.

EXAMPLES OF BALANCING THE NUMBERS

#1


This alignment is balanced and in line with the counting system. I believe this is sound alignment versus this formation.

#2


Again in this example the numbers are balanced.

#3


This is an example of alignment that fails the numbers test. The offense has 7 to the trips side where the defense only has 6. However, I am comfortable aligning this way against trips. It is not something I will do EVERY time, but I will mix it in often enough.

IS THERE A FLAW WITH BALANCING THE NUMBERS?

I think it is a useful tool, however there are many more things to consider with alignment. Disguise, pass coverage, stunts, block angles, personnel, and motion are just some of the other things that should be considered. At a certain level it is important for a coach to take the training wheels off and consider more than just balancing the numbers with the offense. I am not trying to advocate that you should not try to balance up, but that there is more to alignment than balancing numbers with the offense.

If a coach chose to only consider balancing the numbers when determining alignments, there are numerous problems they can run into. For example,

No matter how absurd this alignment is, it is balanced according to the numbers game. If I ask the question: What is wrong with this alignment? I am sure the answers that are coming to mind have nothing to do with balance around the center.

Game Dynamics and Football Part II: Scouting and Play-Calling

In the sport of football coaches are always trying to get an edge, this will never change. One of the biggest things for defensive coaches is scouting offenses in the hopes of being able to call the right defenses at the right time come game day. There are varied views on the use of scouting programs and the reliability of tendencies, however, I think all can agree that we get some positive help from the process. In this article I will explore the game dynamics behind the calls coaches make, the statistical analysis behind them, and finally some ideas and principals that can be used (theoretically) to optimize their play calling.

Dynamic III- Game Theory and Optimization

General Football Strategy

No matter what team you are facing, tendencies will be present, period. Why is this the case? The reason is that coaches understand that certain situations call have particular optimal plays to call. For Example, consider this situation and assume that these teams are evenly matched opponents. You run a power-I offense, it is 3rd and inches on the -20. What type of call makes sense? Some type of inside run or QB sneak seems best, and most would agree with that. Will this play call succeed 100% of the time? No. It will succeed an overwhelming majority of the time, but it is in no way a lock. It is a high percentage play. Do all coaches in this situation run this play type 100% of the time? No. Why not if it appears to be clearly the best choice?

The defense is aware of the optimal play for the offense to run as well. Defense's load up the box and try to stuff the short run, if he could, a standard defensive coordinator would load all 11 of his players to stop the run. Few defenses ever commit all 11 players to stopping the run first, even in a 3rd and short situation. The reason they don't do this, is because the offense could easily exploit them. The offense could fake a base run and then throw a long pass to an uncovered receiver or fake the run and have the QB keep the ball on a naked bootleg. These types of plays force the defense to slow down some of their players on run support. Because of this Offensive coaches throw in little wrinkles here and there to keep the defense honest.

So will a play caller run the inside run/ sneak combo 100% of the time, No, but he will most of the time. Does the small % of time the offense runs something different affect the strategy of the defense? It certainly does. This is the game dynamics that are studied under the field of Game Theory (a branch of Economics and Mathematics). Game Theory applies to the sciences of decision making and competition games in general. Using game theory we can discover optimal choices to make, given certain circumstances.

Analyzing Football Tendencies and Statistics

When we scout, generally there are 4 main tendency areas we analyze:

1. Situation (including Down and Distance)
2. Formation
3. Personnel
4. Field Position

Beginning with situational analysis, we try to group different situations together and see if there is any statistical relationships. 1st and 10, 2nd and long, and 3rd and short are all situations we look at. Most coaches go the extent to break down 2 pt plays. With this data we get a snapshot of what the team is trying to do. For the most part, as coaches we discover obvious things like "they pass more on 3rd and long", "The run inside on 3rd and short", and "They do a bunch of different things on 2nd and medium". Every now and then, we stumble into a very clear down and distance tendency that goes beyond general football strategy. But this is rare, for the most part we discover basic things.

When we begin to break down formations, we get another set of tendencies. Consider this data.

Pro-I Rt formation

70% Run 30% Pass
Runs Right 72% Left 28%

Runs

Iso-Rt 30%
Power Rt 13%
Toss Rt 9%
Counter Lt 18%
Belly Rt 10%
Trap Lt 5%
Iso Lt 5%

When you look at this formation data, you find out that they like to run the right(strong side) twice as much as the left. Does this mean the defense should overload to the strong side when they see this information? No! Why not?

The data shows a tendency to the right side of the formation, however there are enough plays (by number and type) to the left that forces the defenses to respect those plays. If you overplay the right-side of this team, they are going to attack the left side quick. This is a major part of putting together a scheme. A classical example of this is the toss pass. If a team is killing you with the toss, sooner or later your corner (assuming he plays pass first deep 1/3 or 1/4) is gonna come off and play the toss aggressively. When a play caller sees that corner make a tackle close to the LOS. You can bet that the toss pass is coming up real soon. Because of the threat of the toss pass, the corner cannot come up on the toss aggressively. A team might never even have to run a toss pass, the threat of it is enough to keep the defense honest.


From Personnel and field position we can gather similar sets of information, but for the most part we will be in the same situation the first two areas, seeing a tendency, but limited in how aggressive it can be attacked.

Why do we scout then?

If you begin to combine the various things together a more accruate and clear picture can become present. You might find that 3rd and 8 Pro-I right formation is 60% pass with 80% of the passes being bootlegs. Given the game situation you might beleive that the opposing play caller will favor the pass. The other passes he has shown in this situation thus far are 5 step drop back passes. Given this play calling range, sending a backer/safety off the edge to the Boot Leg side seems optimal (as long as you get a body on the full back leaking out). Also, if it happens to be a running play, you don't lose much bringing an edge rusher. By combining different areas of statistics we can find more reliable albeit more particular tendencies. With the limited time we have to scout, we can only analyze so many situations. However the situations we do analyze can become very helpful come game-day. What can the offense do to combat this? Simple, balance his Play-call range.

Balancing Range Example-Poker

I don't know how many of you are poker players, but games like No-Limit Texas Hold-em involve similar dynamics to the football situation discussed above. Consider this situation (not realistic, but simplified for the example, you are playing someone heads up (2 players total), and you know this player will raise Pre-flop with any pair, and any combination of aces and face cards, and a few others. Further more, you know that if you re-raise him after he raises, that he will only call with Pocket Aces, Kings, and Queens. Given this situation, you (ideally) should re-raise every time he raises. You would exploit this player because he would allow you to bluff him too much because of his limited calling range.

How can this player keep himself from being exploited? First off he should call with more hands, and begin pushing all-in with some of his hands too, because you will be raising him with weak hands at times. If he adjust this way, you are put into a guessing game. This forces you to play your hands in a more standard way. How did this opponent keep you from exploiting him? He balanced the way he played his hand to keep you from exploiting him.

This applies to football too.


Back to Football.....

Assume that you are an offensive play caller. On 3rd down and long out of a 2x2 Gun formation you have the following tendencies

5 Step pass 80%

Sprint out Pass 10%

Run 10%

Given this distribution, a defensive coordinator is gonna be excited about this situation. The optimal call here is to blitz, because these passes take time to develop. To prevent this the offense coordinator should make calls to balance the situation and deter the defense from stunting. The calls used to balance the range are plays that hurt heavy blitzing. A more balanced range would like this:

5 Step Pass 65%

Sprint out Pass 10%

Screen 15%

Draw 10%

This presence of 25% screens/draws slows the DC's willingness to blitz. He must respect your ability to screen and run draws. If he stunts into one of these plays he could be in bad situation. This distribution changes the optimal call for the play caller. The optimal call is now to play a more basic defense that is focused on defending the pass. By balancing the play calling range the offensive coordinator can protect his QB from seeing constant blitzes. Balancing the call range does not guarantee no blitzes, just that he won't try to blitz every play. If he did happen to blitz every time in this situation, you could call screens and draws liberally to punish his aggressiveness. The best thing for the defensive play-caller to do, is mix up his own calls to include some blitzes and base calls. If I took the time, game theory models could provide the optimal balance.

A Wrench in the Works

" The Intuitive Play Caller"

Some coaches claim to be "feel" guys. They don't need a lot of statistical scouting information or planning for that manner, they believe that they can feel the game out and know what to call. I am not saying that these people don't exist, but how do you deal with these play callers? Let's assume that some of these people are so good that they can know what you are gonna call before you do at times? I am sure some of you reading this have had this experience before, when you just knew what a person was going to call. How do you combat this person, if they in fact are able to know what plays you are going to call? Simple, be unpredictable, to the extent that you have some randomness in the range of your play-calls. Here is an example to illustrate:

Lets say you are playing a person in Rock, Paper, Scissors. This person is astute at knowing what you are going to select, to the point he can beat you 2/3rds of the time. There is nothing you really can do to get an edge on this person, but you can reduce the edge he has and even the game. How do you do this, be unpredictable. If you look at your watch and the seconds hand is on a #1-3 you pick Rock, #4-6 you pick Paper, and #7-9 you pick Scissors. If your opponent has no idea that you are doing this, there is no way he can guess what you are going to throw. The game will return to its basic design, a guessing game based on chance, similar to flipping a coin, or rolling dice.

In football, if you are faced with a guy that knows how you are going to call plays, you could attempt something similar. Perhaps not to this extreme of an extent, but something to keep your opponent guessing. For Example, assume you want your opponent to respect your punt fakes, and you want to fake 10% of the time. Before you punt look at the score board if the game clock ends in 7 you run a fake. If it ends in any other # you punt the ball. If you keep this to yourself, no one will know when you will run a fake, they will be forced into a guessing game, with no idea of how to know when you will do what.


Conclusion

Game Theory plays a role in any game that involves decision making. The decision making process is at the heart of coaching on game-day. People like Bill Walsh were masters of planning and to an extent his ideas were consistent with Game Theory Optimal ideas. Just like in poker, keeping your opponent guessing makes life easier for you and your team.

The examples and ideas in this article were grounded in the "Ideal/Theoretical" domain. However, most of the time decisions on the field transcend this domain. These examples existed in a vacuum and involved small tidbits of information. This article was aimed at showing how optimal strategies and calls do exist given the information that you have. In the next article, I will go to the dynamics beyond game theory, and involve the importance of understanding the thinking of your opponent. That much of optimal scouting goes beyond the situation and formation tendencies, but extends into understanding the overall philosophy and though process of your opponent. In games of decision making, this psychological and logical dynamic is often the one that separates the good from the great.